"It's tough to make predictions, especially about the future" is one of my favorite pieces of Yogi Berra wisdom. Yes, it is tough. But I'm going to try nonetheless, hedging my bets as appropriate because crystal balls are notoriously cloudy. And these predictions, mind you, cover the next few years, not the next few decades. No one can see that far ahead. I begin with: Prediction # 1: Transparency about monetary policy will increase over time.
I feel confident in predicting this as a generic statement, although the pace and details will vary from one central bank to the next. After all, some are extremely transparent already, while others are less so. But virtually all central banks have been moving in one direction in recent decades--toward greater openness--and I don't believe that process is over. This prediction derives in part from pretty strong historical evidence that transparency is a one-way street: Once a central bank moves toward greater transparency in some dimension, it never reverts back to its old, less-transparent ways.
Here's one new piece of evidence. Three co-authors and I recently conducted a survey of central bankers (Blinder et al., 2017) , asking them a variety of questions about how monetary policy did or did not change during and after the financial crisis. Among the questions was:
Once conditions return to normal, do you think forward guidance about future monetary policy should remain a potential instrument of monetary policy, remain an instrument but in modified form, be discontinued, or that it is too early to judge?
Remember, the very idea of forward guidance was rejected by most central banks outside of New Zealand for years and became common only as an emergency measure during the crisis. So you might imagine that the attractiveness of forward guidance wane as the crisis retreats into history. This forecast is relevant to monetary policy communication because forward guidance is one of the main unconventional tools a number of central banks adopted after encountering the ELB.
(The other is quantitative easing.) Before that, the canonical belief was that (a) refusing to give forward-looking information was part of proper central banking practice and (b) they didn't need forward guidance for monetary control anyway. But with average nominal interest rates during, say, the next quarter century very likely to be below the average over, say, 1983-2008 , and with recessions not banished, central banks seem highly likely to encounter the ELB more in the future than they did in the past (Kiley and Roberts, 2017) . They will therefore need to deploy unconventional monetary policies more often; and one of those unconventional policies will be forward guidance. This observation leads naturally to my third prediction:
Prediction # 3: Forward guidance is now an instrument of monetary policy.
1 A parallel survey asked economists, most of whom were academics, the same question. Among the academics, only 4% thought it was too early to judge and 9% thought forward guidance should be discontinued.
Forward guidance, as practiced during and after the crisis, changed the nature and purpose of central bank communication. Traditionally, greater communication was seen as a way to tighten the link between the overnight nominal interest rate (which the central bank controls) and the medium-and long-term interest rates that matter for saving and investment decisions (Blinder, 1998; Bernanke, 2004) . The idea was to use central bank talk to move the whole yield curve up or down. But doing that became impossible once short rates hit their ELBs. Hence a new idea was born: Use forward guidance to flatten the yield curve, that is, to pull medium-and long-term interest rates down even though the short rate is stuck at the ELB. Communication Conceptually, forward guidance relies on the expectations theory of the term structure. A central bank moves medium and long rates by moving expectations of future short rates. But as we all know, the expectations theory with rational expectations is an abysmal empirical failure.
The theory has been tested many times, on different combinations of interest rates, in different countries and different time periods, and almost always gets rejected by the data. 2 Yet academics, market participants, and central bankers alike treat the naked emperor as if he were smartly clothed--and keep on using the expectations theory. That's the Great Embarrassment.
I leave it as an open question whether the theory's abject failure stems from the expectations mechanism itself or from the assumption of rational expectations-though I can't resist observing that rational expectations typically fails when tested directly on expectational data. Prediction # 4: Central banks will keep trying to communicate with the general public, as they should. But for the most part, they will fail.
Many economic models presume that central bank communication is aimed at wage-setters, price-setters, consumers, or investors-maybe all of them. But are they listening? A recent paper by Kumar et al. (2015) suggests they are not. The authors studied survey results on inflation expectations and knowledge of monetary policy among (mostly small) business managers in New Zealand, the country where inflation targeting has been practiced longer than anywhere else. They found not only huge cross-sectional variance in expected inflation rates, but also that inflation expectations were not at all anchored around the Reserve Bank of New Zealand's widely-publicized target. In short, business managers apparently had not received the messages that the RBNZ had sent over and over again. Or maybe they just didn't believe the messages, which is almost the same thing.
Who did receive the central bank's messages? Well, monetary policy experts and RBNZ watchers, of course. Thus, much as we may believe that an independent central bank in a democracy should communicate with the citizenry, only a tiny fraction of the citizenry will tune in. As I said in discussing the Kumar et al. (2015) paper, "it reminds us that most people are not obsessed about the central bank; as the authors note, they would rather watch puppies on
YouTube." Though attractive to game theorists, I believe the commitment view is wrong as a matter of history. Furthermore, it will continue to be wrong going forward because central bankers don't like to tie themselves to masts or to anything else. Instead, the main purpose of communication about monetary policy is to influence market expectations by forecasting its own behavior, not to pre-commit policymakers to any future course of action. It's about prediction--and highly conditional prediction at that.
The adjective, "conditional," is crucial--and problematic--here. Ever since the RBNZ started publishing "forward tracks" in 1997, central banks have emphasized the conditional nature of their interest-rate projections: "We will do this only if x, y, and z happen (or don't happen)." But it is impossible for a central bank to spell out at time t all the conditions that might be relevant to its monetary policy decision at time t+j. Even attempting to do so would produce a long list that might well confuse market participants more than enlighten them. KISS is an essential principle when dealing with traders, who seem incapable of entertaining more than one thought at a time.
A telling Federal Reserve example arose in December 2012, when the FOMC adopted the "Evans approach" to forward guidance with these words: 
.the Committee will also consider other information, including additional measures of labor market conditions, indicators of inflation pressures and inflation expectations, and readings on financial developments.
Notice a few things about this carefully-crafted statement. First, the Committee enunciated three criteria for staying at "zero," two of them with numerical precision: Unemployment must stay above 6.5%, inflation cannot go higher than 2.5%, and inflation expectations must remain "well anchored" (presumably near 2%). Second, in addition to these three variables, "other information" from labor markets, financial markets, and elsewhere would be relevant to the Fed's "lift-off" decision. Finally, the important words "at least as long" indicated that unemployment dropping below 6.5% would not necessarily trigger a rate hike. It was a necessary, but not a sufficient condition. All that added up to pretty complicated conditionality.
Too complicated, it turned out. Before long, traders had translated this careful, complex message into an overly-simple, and hence inaccurate, one: The Fed would begin to raise rates as soon as the unemployment rate dipped below 6.5%. Period. The FOMC was unhappy about this (mis)translation of its intent and abandoned the Evans approach at its March 2014 meeting. (The unemployment rate was then 6.7% and falling.) Since then, the FOMC has kept its conditionality vague. For example, the most recent statement "looks forward" in this way:
The Committee expects that economic conditions will evolve in a manner that will warrant gradual increases in the federal funds rate; the federal funds rate is likely to remain, for some time, below levels that are expected to prevail in the longer run. However, the actual path of the federal funds rate will depend on the economic outlook as informed by incoming data.
Try translating that into a number, or even into a simple set of inequalities. The message here is pretty clear: The FOMC was not unanimous in December 2017, but the majority believed that, with labor markets so tight, it was prudent to nudge interest rates up another 25 basis points. A minority, however, thought that was premature.
The central bank can thus give voice to both majority and minority views without producing a cacophony. But it may need a few more words to do so. It's high time that central banks, which have travelled a long way down the communications road already, cease viewing words as scarce commodities to be given only grudgingly. Montagu Norman was wrong; they should explain.
